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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate and find out the inner differences between stand-alone firms and those participating to 
Productive Chain Networks (PCNs) as far as ownership and corporate governance characteristics are 
concerned. PCNs are typical Italian economic realities made of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
which behave like a unique meta-firm. Different clusters are found from an empirical analysis: firms 
outside PCNs, leaders in PCNs and suppliers participating to PCNs. The clusters differentiate on 
corporate governance practices and the consequent capability to attract funding from ﬁnancial institutions. 
The inner differences in governance structure relate to the underpinnings of the competitive advantage of 
the chain: the higher the human capital contribution, the more the governance frame diverts from standard 
managerial models. Our empirical findings show that the typical banks’ financing system (i.e. as it stems 
from Basel II and III rules) prefers to allocate credit to firms with worse corporate governance attributes, 
since a scaffolding finance approach links to the adopted models of firm’s governance when participating 
to PCNs. 
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I. Introduction 
Italy is typically thought as the Kingdom of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), with weak and vulnerable capital structures. Their long-term competitive 
advantage seems to root more into the Entrepreneurial Competences, as crafted by the 
owner/founder of the firm, than into the efficiency in managing assets. Accordingly, the 
governance of the Italian firms tends to divert from standard managerial models, given 
the wider control of the firm given to the Entrepreneur. Direct consequences of this 
particular model of corporate governance are the biased financial structures of these 
companies: higher levels of debt-to-equity ratios along with a generalized capital 
rationing status, as driven by higher agency costs. Nevertheless, these companies 
demonstrate an unusually high survival ratio which let intuited that such model solutions 
must have some positive elements. 
The high frequency of SMEs, as reported from Italian statistics, is often the 
consequence of surveys based on the legal status, only, of the firms. Since these firms 
are separated legal bodies, they are usually thought to be independent as far as the 
governance relationships are concerned. A more careful transaction analysis approach, 
however, shows that these companies are less independent than it might appear in the 
evidence sourced from their legal profile. In fact, according to Mantovani and Daniotti 
(2012, page 84), there is a wide evidence of business networks which behave as a unique 
“meta-firm” even if they are made of several legal entities. The inner characteristic of 
these bodies is the specific contribution provided by each member of the network to its 
overall competitive advantage. This is made, particularly, through specific capabilities of 
each member to provide superior efficiency in the use of productive inputs, meanwhile 
those members are particularly capable to coordinate themselves as components of a 
unique (larger) firm. Frequently, a “network leader” is selected between them to have a 
more efficient and cooperative behavior; such a leader is often the gateway for specific 
market transactions. The final evidence is a productive-chain network (PCN) which 
behaves like a unique larger (meta)firm, but has, at least, the same flexibility of SMEs as 
boosted by the higher capability to substitute any of its component without shutting 
down the PCN itself. 
Melting different legal bodies into a unique meta-firm like a PCNs might increase 
the difficulties of SMEs both in managing governance and in financing the investments. 
In fact, the above normal agency risk that characterizes entrepreneurial businesses might 
either explode or drop down given the actual behavior of PCNs and their components 
of the structure. The lack of a clear legal perimeter of the meta-firm strongly contributes 
to detect the fair risk of any PCN member. This is why PCNs seems to adopt a 
“scaffolding” finance approach, usually obtained by delegating the financial managerial 
function to one of the member firms (Mestroni et al., 2013). Credit allowances are 
therefore given to the financial leader which intermediates them for the entire PCN and 
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is called to bear the overall agency risks, as generated by the governance of the members 
inside the network.  
To insulate firms inside PCNs from the stand-alone ones (SA), we adopt 
Mestroni et al. (2013) methodology. Such an approach let us cluster the firms between 
leaders (LF) and support members (SF) of the PCN.  Standard models to investigate 
corporate governance characteristics of private firm inside the network (both LF and SF) 
are adopted to compare results with those for SA. We think this analysis is important 
because good corporate governance practices assist SMEs in improving their funding 
capabilities without any rationing. According to Claessen et al. (2002), better corporate 
frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better 
performance and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders. Donaldson (2003) posits 
that good corporate governance is important for increasing investor confidence and 
market liquidity. However, while the literature relates mainly to large managerial 
corporations, Entrepreneurial Business and SMEs’ corporate governance are less 
investigated, while nothing refers to PCNs and their scaffolding finance.  
In this paper, the focus of analysis is on relations existing between the 
governance of the firms participating to a PCN and their financial performance, 
including the capability to reap debt capital. We carry on an empirical analysis over a 
particular geographic area in the North East of Italy, which is made up of three regions: 
Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige. The reason of this focus, is a 
direct consequence of the higher frequency of PCNs along with its economic relevance. 
In fact, one fourth of the private Italian GDP is produced here, while one fifth of the 
national population resides there and one third of total national exports originate from 
there (Cannari et al., 2011).  
This paper aims to contribute to fill this gap, by studying the relationship 
between various corporate governance characteristics with past and future performance 
as well as with the ability to raise capital. In fact, we believe that corporate governance 
information can add value to the overall efficiency of the credit allocation system, which 
in turns contributes to the success of SMEs growth and for PCNs as well. We try to 
detect whether a set of more qualitative characteristics of the governance (e.g., ownership 
concentration and structure, CEO duality and board independence, team and board size) 
are linked to firm performance, its merit of credit (as defined by Mantovani et al., 2013) 
and finally whether the real banking system considers them in deciding whether or not 
to give debt financing.   
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents current 
literature on the topic; section 3 deploys the empirical evidence emerging from our 
research effort; section 4 discusses results and concludes. We find that there are 
differences in ownership and corporate governance characteristics for the three clusters 
of firms in four out of seven variables studied in this analysis. An interesting result of 
this paper is that true behaviors of banks prefer governance-inefficient firms, while the 
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new rating system (i.e. based on persistency of ex-ante performance according to 
Mantovani et al., 2013) prefers governance-efficient firms. 
 
II. Background Why corporate networks could do it better: a literature 
review  
 
Modern managerial approaches require a transparent corporate governance 
arrangement. This is coherent with the classic separation theorem of financial literature. 
In fact, the governance framework becomes a must when corporate liabilities are 
intended as contingent claims over corporate assets. The best practices in "corporate 
finance" are typically coherent with this approach. This is also why researchers 
concentrate over the links between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Entrepreneurial finance seems to tell us very a different story. Liabilities appear 
to be contingent claims over the contribution that the Entrepreneur's capability may give 
to sustainability of financial performances (Mantovani, 2015). Consequently, the 
required governance for entrepreneurial businesses may differ from standard models in 
managerial businesses. This is a direct consequence of the necessity to guarantee to the 
Entrepreneur a wider control over the business. The risk of misperception over such a 
diversion is then very high: an entrepreneurial requirement may be intended as a 
corporate bias.  
Mantovani and Daniotti (2012) discover an interesting relationship among 
manufacturing enterprises within the Treviso2 District: for every eight companies, there 
exists a bigger firm which has access to bank credit and re-distributes it to the supplier. 
The pool of the 1+7 legal entities tends to act as a unique (larger) firm, being more 
flexible than a stand-alone company and having the opportunity to substitute/integrate 
in an easy way any missing requirement by substituting some members participating to 
the group. Accordingly, the resulting PCN made by these companies is a meta-firm 
indeed. In fact, it has an economic frame that goes beyond the legal entities composing 
it, but behaves as a unique economic agent. Inside the framework, bigger companies tend 
to invest in productive capital, while the smaller ones seem to be more sunk in human 
capital. Accordingly, the bigger companies usually act as coordinators because of their 
higher concentration of tangible assets to fund. At the same time, they are also claimed 
to act as coordinators of the chain against its stakeholders.  
                                                 
 
 
2 Treviso is a major manufactural town in the Venetian Area 
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What about the governance of these cooperating businesses? Can they be run 
through the governance models as adopted by corporations and/or entrepreneurial 
business? Is their financial performance impacted by the solutions they tend to adopt? 
Are credit allowances impacted? These doubts drive the paper to investigate on the gaps 
existing between stand-alone firms and wider meta-firms as PNCs as far as governance, 
performance and financial policies are concerned. 
A. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: what about PCNs? 
According to the OECD principles (2004), corporate governance refers to the 
system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The governance structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation (such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders, creditors, auditors, 
regulators, and other stakeholders) as well as the rules and procedures for making 
decisions in corporate affairs. Hence, it is natural to expect a link between corporate 
governance firm characteristics and its performance. Existing literature confirms the 
presence of a positive association between good corporate governance and firm 
performance. In fact, there are several studies in the literature, which establish a positive 
association between corporate governance firm characteristics and firm performance 
such as Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Brickly et al., 1994; Williams, 2000; Drobetz et al., 
2003; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Hossain et al., 2001; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Gemmill and Thomas, 2004; Weisbach, 1988.  
In this study, we are dealing with Italian private SMEs. Italy is a particular case 
because the majority of SMEs are family enterprises (Corbetta, 2002), firms in which the 
majority of the capital is held by one, or few, families. In family firms, the entrepreneur 
is used to concentrate all responsibilities in his hands and the governance structure may 
not be considered a relevant issue.  
The family might choose either to act mainly as an owner/inspector, leaving the 
executive power to professional managers, or to act both as owner and leading manager 
(Dyer, 1989; Daily and Dollinger, 1992; Gersick et al., 1997). In the first case, the Agency 
Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1980) postulates that the 
separation between ownership and control requires an agency relationship. In family 
companies, separation of ownership from control arises with fragmented ownership and 
reduced family member participation in the business (Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
Within this framework, it is recommended that: i) the board should be made up mainly 
from “non-executive” directors, ii) the CEO and the Chairman of the Board should be 
two different persons, iii) bigger boards are better than smaller ones. In the second case, 
the Stewardship Theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Doucouliagos, 1994), the goals of the family ownership and the 
nonfamily managers seem to be aligned, which translates into the following guidelines: 
i) the involvement of the executive directors increases the effectiveness of the board 
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activities; ii) the leadership structure is preferable to the separated one; (iii) the size of 
the board of directors should be small.  
Despite the type of framework adopted, according to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004), an effective corporate governance system can lower the 
cost of capital and encourage firms to use resources more efficiently, thereby promoting 
growth. These factors implicitly and explicitly support the belief that better corporate 
governance will result in higher firm value and more profitable firm performance. Hence, 
we formulate the first research questions of this study: 
 
RQ1. What kind of distinctive relationships exist between a set of corporate governance and ownership 
indicators and the historical firm performance (e.g. ROI) in PCN member firms? 
 
There are different ways to measure corporate governance characteristics. We 
concentrate on the most utilized in the literature, as well as we are limited in our analysis 
by data availability. The level of Ownership Concentration is well studied in the literature 
but with no clear conclusion on what constitutes a positive impact on the firm. In fact, 
according to Berle and Means, 1932; Leech and Leahy,1991; Prowse, 1992; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; and Cho, 1998, it appears that owner controlled firms (where there is 
one equity holder with a block exceeding 10%) outperform manager controlled firms. 
Hence, for US and UK data, the empirical evidence is supportive of the hypothesis that 
large shareholders are active monitors in companies and that direct shareholder 
monitoring help boost firm performance. However, empirical studies on other countries’ 
datasets (Germany, France, Australia and Japan) arrive at different conclusions. One 
thing to notice is that US and UK have, in general, lower concentration levels and it 
could well be that once concentration levels are very high, more monitoring may not 
improve things. Italy is a country with the highest level of concentration (OECD, 1999).  
The Presence of a Manager in the Ownership Structure is another variable that 
we will study. Its importance goes back to the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who 
suggest that managerial ownership affects the value of a firm, and that of Morck et al. 
(1988), who think that the stake of managers in firm ownership can act as a mechanism 
to align the interests of managers and owners, and ultimately affect firm value. 
Additionally, we look at Team Size or the number of people involved with the 
management of the firm. We adjusted these variables based on firm size.  
 We think it is particularly interesting to study the variable One Manager for the 
Italian SMEs sector, because it is not uncommon to find this situation and we deem it 
an important governance characteristic. Team Size and One Manager are related to the 
literature, which studies the impact of the efforts of an entire team compared to a single 
person based on the belief that teams are “essential to the specialized work of 
maintaining the organization in operations (Barnard, 1938; Hambrichk, 1989)” 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance  Volume 17, No. 1  Spring 2015   
 
 
7 
We also look at CEO Duality. Harris and Helfat (1998) support that absence of 
CEO Duality have a negative impact on firm’s performance mostly due to agency 
problems and the lack of development of a succession plan and of managerial capabilities  
According to agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), 
Board of Directors Independence, that is boards with a majority of non-executive 
directors reduce agency conflicts because non-executives provide an effective 
monitoring tool for the board.  
Board of Directors Size is adjusted by firm size3. Literature agrees in finding a 
negative effect of Board Size on firm performance mainly due to negative effects from 
poor communication and difficult decision-making procedure (Guest, 2009). However, 
these studies focus on large companies while for SMEs the effect is not so clear. 
Bennedsen et al (2007) find that also for SMEs the effect is negative. 
 
B. In the middle of the Market/Hierarchy puzzle: the PCN solution 
The idea of a productive chain network is not new within the theory of the firm. 
According to Coase (1937) as well as Williamson (1975, 1981), when transacting parties 
must make relationship-specific investments in an environment of incomplete 
contracting, it is sometimes better to integrate the transacting parties into a single firm. 
Given a growing awareness of the efficacy and effectiveness of hybrid organizations, 
many authors try to re-define firm boundaries, Butler (1982) supports the existence of 
numerous forms of organizations that mix market and hierarchies solutions, in which 
the discriminating factors are the levels of communication and collaboration. Nacamulli 
(1985), instead, supports that firms seek resources control and make no difference 
whether it is reached through formal firm boundaries enlargement or inter-firms 
relationships. Alchian and Demesetz (1972) find the origin of hybrids forms of 
integration in production technology, where output is not the mere sum of different 
inputs but it needs the combination of shared resources and competencies. According 
to Rugiadini (1985), if integration depends on shared resources and competencies, a 
tradeoff between transactional costs (market) and structural costs (hierarchy) must exist. 
A feed-back correction mechanism, in a context of limited rationality, helps to reduce 
the costs of integration. However, in an inter-firm collaboration context, it can be 
implemented only if there is mutual trust (Butler and Carney 1983). Trust, in fact, allows 
to reduce control costs, avoiding moral hazard (Eccles 1981), and contemporary, it 
                                                 
 
 
3 Size criteria elaborated on the base of 96/280/EC: Commission Recommendation of 3 April 
1996 concerning the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises 
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facilitates the know-how transmission and sharing (Teece 1980). Such elements 
determine the optimal firm boundaries that, as authors say, can be enlarged also through 
inter-firm collaboration. Integration among the firms in the same chain production, is 
an example of market and hierarchy’s mechanism mix with specific investments, shared 
resources, feed-back mechanisms and mutual trust built in long-term relationships. 
In this context of uncertainty for the definition of the optimal firm boundaries, 
it is very important to identify aggregates of smaller and larger firms and study their 
performance and risk characteristics (Rugiadini, 1985; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; 
Garzella, 2000; Broglia Giuggi, 2001; Cainelli and Iacobucci 2011).  
Mestroni et al. (2013) propose a methodology to identify the PCNs aggregations 
and their components. Figures 1 and 2 (Mestroni et al., 2013) represent the different 
financial activities of a Leader Firm (Scaffolding Finance) and a Stand Alone firm 
(Corporate Finance). 
 
Figure 1: Typical corporate investments and financing of a Stand Alone firm (SA). 
Financial relations in the case of a Stand-Alone firm that does not present significant collaborative relationships among 
its supply chain. The firm funds (equity and debt resources) only to finance its business (investments and working 
capital).  Where, Net Financial Resources = Equity + Net Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scaffolding finance relations for a Leader firm (LF) heading a collaborative PCN. 
Financial relationships among a Leader Firm and its supply chain network. The Leader Firm collects financial 
resources (equity and debt resources) to support both its own business (investments and working capital) and the cash 
needs of its productive chain. The Leader Firm finances the productive chain by using favorable conditions in 
Company 
W
KCA 
Fixed 
Assets 
 
WKCA 
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commercial transaction, instead of financial transactions, which generate above normal working capital intensity and 
added financial needs to Supporter Firm.  
Where, Net Financial Resources = Equity + Net Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts a stand-alone firm (SA), which uses financial resources for its corporate 
needs, only. On the other hand, (Figure 2) leading firms (LF) intermediate financial 
resources for the entire chain network and allocate them into the PCN using the working 
capital, since commercial relationships to the supporter members of the chain (SF) are 
the most controllable allocative solution. The main differences between leader firms (LF) 
and stand-alone ones (SA) is the dimension and economic composition of invested 
assets. LF presents strong relations to its suppliers and anticipates payments to the 
production chain, by financing supporting firms. These additional assets are registered 
by the LF increase in assets value as generated by current advances. Based on this 
concepts, Mestroni et al. (2013) proposes to identify PCNs by comparing the capital 
intensity of the firms and its breakdown as far as working capital and fixed asset intensity 
are concerned. A control is made by comparing the absolute level of the two capital 
intensities and their relative level, in order to separate firms with inefficient working 
capital management from the LF. In fact, while the greater is the absolute working capital 
intensity, the higher is the probability to identify a PCN leader if and only if the relative 
Leader 
W
KCA 
WKCA 
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working capital is also higher4. This approach to PCNs supports our second research 
question:  
 
RQ2. Are there significant differences in the corporate governance and ownership concentration between 
firms inside and outside a PCN? 
 
C. Measuring The merit of credit in "Corporate" and "Scaffolding" Finance  
Mestroni et al. (2013) delved deeper in the above relationship and verified it over 
a larger geographic region: the Tri-Veneto (Venetia Area). They found out that a 
scaffolding finance relationship exists indeed, and confirm the necessity for banks to 
determine the merit of credit based on the overall network instead than focusing on 
single entities included in the network. The resulting financial behavior is truly new, 
sometimes opposite to the more traditional prescriptions of corporate finance theory. 
The company receiving new funding is valuated for the performance of the PCN they 
are leading (or are included); corporate specific indicator may be uncorrelated with the 
overall banking capital flows to the firm.  
Following Mantovani et al. (2013), who show that the merit of credit is not 
correctly analyzed and priced within the banks' financing system, we try to extend the 
investigation of the merit of credit determinants introducing qualitative factors such as 
corporate governance indicators and focusing on the different actors inside the 
Productive Chain Network. Indeed, the third research question is: 
 
RQ3. Which relationship exists between the corporate governance and ownership indicators and bank 
credit allowances decisions to firms being inside and outside Production Chain Network? 
 
The Basel compliant rating systems are criticized about their true capability to 
drive toward a more efficient allocation of the banking allowances. This is why we 
investigate whether the governance set can be more related to the results of a more 
efficient method to rate ex-ante the corporate performances. We decided to recur to the 
Integrated Rating method as proposed in Mantovani et al. (2014). This methodology sets 
the rating according to the spread between long-term persistent company ROI [P(ROI)] 
and its threshold level [T(ROI)]. T(ROI) is estimated as the risk-adjusted expected return 
                                                 
 
 
4 When the relative intensity of working capital (i.e. working capital/fixed assets) is normal and the absolute 
level of the intensity (working capital/Revenues) is above normal the entire invested capital is inflated, signaling a 
lower efficiency in managing corporate investments 
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recurring to the Integrated Rating methodology, an original evolution of the certainty 
equivalent equilibrium context (Lintner, 1965) and applied in a long-term persistency 
confidence framework as adopted in the calculation of the T-Ratio (Mantovani, 2015).  
To detect such the link to corporate governance characteristics of the different 
actors inside the Productive Chain Network, we search for an answer to this last research 
question: 
 
RQ4. Are corporate governance and ownership indicators impacting over the long-term sustainability of 
corporate performance of entities involved into a Production Chain Network? 
 
 
III. The Empirical Evidence 
 
We sourced the same sample as in Mestroni et al. (2013), thus recurring to 
ORBIS database (edited by Bureau van Dijk). The sample includes 4'975 manufacturing 
firms5 (NACE industry codes from 13 to 32), incorporated in the three North-Eastern 
Regions of Italy (i.e. “Veneto”, “Friuli Venezia-Giulia” and “Trentino Alto-Adige”). The 
sample is selected according to firms having financial reports data for every year from 
2006 to 2012. According to Mestroni et al. (2013), we use the 6-years financial reports 
data to divide the sample into three clusters: 1'108 Stand Alone firms; 548 Leader Firms; 
3'319 Supporter Firms. The ratio of the PCN firms (LF + SF = 3’867) versus the LF 
(548) is 7.05, i.e. fairly next to the empirical results by Mantovani and Daniotti (2012) for 
the Treviso District only. We investigate relations among the governance variables and 
three indexes:  
- Operating Return On Productive Capital (Eq.1) as measure of operative performance; 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑡 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝑡
(𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑡+ 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡+𝐹𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑡−1+ 𝑊𝐾𝐶𝐴𝑡−1)/2
                                                     (1) 
 
- Absolute Indebtedness (Eq.2) as proxy of banks credit preferences 
Absolute Indebtedness =
𝐷𝐸𝐵
𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡
= [(𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡
∗+𝑁𝐹𝑃𝑡−1
∗ ) / 2] 
𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑡
                           (2) 
Where,  
                                                 
 
 
5 According to Mantovani and Daniotti (2012), the creation of synergies, which is central in a 
Production Chain Network, is mostly relevant in the manufacturing sector 
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NFP = Net Financial Debt = Short Term Financial Debt + Long Term Financial Debt – Cash (and cash equivalents) 
EBIT = Earnings before interest and taxes 
FIAS = Fixed Assets  
WKCA= Operating Working Capital = Debtors + Inventory - Creditors 
OPRE = Operating Revenue 
 
- the true merit of credit as proxied by the Integrated Rating Score, i.e. the spread 
between the P(ROI) and the T(ROI) as above (Mantovani et al., 2014). 
 
To detect the critical elements of the governance structure, we investigate the 
following ownership control and corporate governance indicators based on data 
availability: 
1) BvD (Bureau van Dijk) Independence Indicator, which classifies firms based 
on the level of ownership concentration.  
2) Presence of a manager in the ownership structure. This variable is constructed 
as a dummy, where the value equals 1 if there is a manager in the ownership structure. 
We hypothesize that in terms of good governance practices, the presence of a manager 
in the ownership structure is indication of better governance quality. 
3) Team Size, that is the number of people involved with the management of the 
firm. We adjusted this variable based on firm size. We hypothesize that in terms of good 
governance practices, the bigger the team size, the better the governance level. 
4) One Manager. This variable is constructed as a dummy, where the value equals 
1 if the company is managed by only one person. We think this variable is particularly 
interesting to study for the Italian SMEs sector, because it is not uncommon to find this 
situation and we hypothesize that in terms of governance, it is not a high-quality 
characteristic for a firm to be managed by only one person. 
5) CEO Duality. This variable is constructed as a dummy, where the value equals 
1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board.  
6) Board of Directors Independence Indicator. This variable is constructed as a 
dummy, where the value equals 1 if there are two or more managers in the Board of 
Directors.  
7) Board of Directors Size. This variable is adjusted by firm size6. We hypothesize 
that smaller Board of Director Size is an indication of better corporate governance. 
                                                 
 
 
6 Size criteria elaborated on the base of 96/280/EC: Commission Recommendation of 3 April 1996 
concerning the definition of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Data on the above seven variables is available for the year 2012 only.  
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of these indicators for the final sample 
of analysis. 
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Table 1:  Corporate governance variables and balance sheet data for the entire sample 
Balance Sheet Variables N Average Median Std. Dev. 1Quart 3Quart
Panel A.Stand Alone
ROI % 2007 1108 11% 8% 17% 5% 14%
ROI % 2008 1108 -18% 6% 874% 2% 11%
ROI % 2009 1108 3% 3% 11% -1% 7%
ROI % 2010 1108 4% 4% 11% 0% 7%
ROI % 2011 1108 5% 4% 12% 1% 8%
ROI % 2012 1108 4% 3% 15% -1% 7%
DEB/OPRE %2007 1105 21% 20% 31% 1% 37%
DEB/OPRE %2008 1106 22% 21% 38% 1% 39%
DEB/OPRE %2009 1106 27% 22% 55% 0% 49%
DEB/OPRE %2010 1106 29% 20% 193% 0% 44%
DEB/OPRE %2011 1107 25% 22% 43% 0% 45%
DEB/OPRE %2012 1104 29% 25% 82% 0% 49%
ROI -T_ROI 1071 -1% 1% 87% -1% 3%
Panel B.Supplier Firms
ROI % 2007 3319 28% 16% 226% 8% 32%
ROI % 2008 3319 17% 12% 338% 5% 27%
ROI % 2009 3319 21% 7% 430% 1% 19%
ROI % 2010 3319 18% 9% 92% 3% 21%
ROI % 2011 3319 23% 9% 333% 4% 21%
ROI % 2012 3319 13% 7% 159% 2% 19%
DEB/OPRE %2007 3308 8% 4% 24% -5% 18%
DEB/OPRE %2008 3305 8% 4% 26% -5% 19%
DEB/OPRE %2009 3305 8% 3% 31% -7% 22%
DEB/OPRE %2010 3313 7% 2% 65% -7% 19%
DEB/OPRE %2011 3313 14% 3% 418% -7% 19%
DEB/OPRE %2012 3308 8% 4% 55% -8% 21%
ROI -T_ROI 3131 2% -1% 94% -5% 4%
Panel C.Leader Firms
ROI % 2007 548 14% 10% 23% 6% 18%
ROI % 2008 548 11% 8% 13% 5% 14%
ROI % 2009 548 6% 5% 12% 1% 10%
ROI % 2010 548 7% 6% 11% 3% 11%
ROI % 2011 548 7% 6% 12% 2% 11%
ROI % 2012 548 7% 5% 16% 2% 10%
DEB/OPRE %2007 547 24% 20% 23% 10% 31%
DEB/OPRE %2008 547 26% 21% 23% 11% 34%
DEB/OPRE %2009 547 32% 24% 30% 14% 39%
DEB/OPRE %2010 548 30% 23% 31% 13% 37%
DEB/OPRE %2011 548 30% 23% 29% 13% 37%
DEB/OPRE %2012 547 32% 25% 33% 12% 39%
ROI -T_ROI 543 2% 1% 8% -1% 3%
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According to Table 1, Supplier Firms deploy the highest average ROI over the 
period, while Leader Firms stand in the middle and Stand Alone ones have the lowest 
average ROI. The Stand-alone subset is also the one including firms with a negative ROI 
during the year of the great financial crisis (i.e. 2008). Such an evidence seems to be 
coherent with the hypothesis of higher investment in human capital by suppliers’ firms 
(since the numerator is driven by human capital productivity while the denominator do 
not include investments on the human capital). Moreover, stand-alone firm performance 
seems to lack the benefits of network participation. 
In terms of leverage, Leader firms are those showing the highest average amount 
of debt over the period of analysis, followed by Stand Alone firms and finally by Supplier 
firms. This is consistent with the literature about scaffolding finance (e.g. Mestroni et al., 
2013), stating that the financial leader distributes credit allowances through the working 
capital.  
Finally, as per the merit of credit (i.e. the spread between P(ROI) and T(ROI) 
according to Mantovani et al., 2014), we find out that Leader firms have both the highest 
average and median levels, followed by Supplier firms and finally by Stand Alone firms. 
Even this evidence is coherent with the scaffolding finance approach: the higher merit 
of credit is to be used by the Leader to provide financial resources for the entire network 
survival.  
When looking at corporate governance variables, we observe that Leader Firms 
has the highest presence of “One Manager” and the lowest “Team Size” and, at the same 
time, they present the highest presence in terms of “Manager in the Ownership 
Structure”, the lowest number of “non-executive” directors (Board of Directors 
Independence) but the highest presence of CEO Duality. Differently, Supplier Firms 
have the lowest presence of characteristics for “One Manager” and higher “Team Size”, 
while Stand Alone firms have the lowest presence of “Manager in the Ownership 
Structure”, the highest number of “non-executive” directors (Board of Directors 
Independence) but the lowest presence of “CEO Duality”. 
 
--§--- 
 
To answer to the first research question, we compare ownership and corporate 
governance indicators for the three subgroups identified inside our sample: Stand Alone 
(SA) firms, Leader (LF) firms and Supplier (SF) firms. To evaluate whether there are 
significant differences among the three clusters we perform a t-test of differences. Table 
2 summarizes these characteristics and by mean of a test of differences, identifies the 
statistically significant differences among the three clusters. 
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Table 2: t Test of Mean Difference 
A comparison of differences in means and variances for corporate governance variables among firms organized 
in three clusters (SA, LF, SF). The analysis is performed by mean of a t-test of difference with unequal variance. 
 
 
 
As Table 2 shows, we do not find statistically significant differences between the 
three groups in three out of seven corporate governance indicators: Board 
Independence, CEO Duality and Team Size. Differently, we find that, in terms of 
Ownership Concentration, there are significant differences between the Stand Alone and 
Supplier firms, where SA firms have higher ownership concentration. Also, we find 
significant differences among the three groups of firms for the Presence of Manager 
among Shareholders variable, with LF firms having the highest representation of this 
characteristic. In terms of “One Manager,” there are significant differences between SA 
and LF and between LF and SF, with again LF firms having the highest representation 
of this characteristic. Finally, in terms of Board of Directors Size, there are significant 
differences between SA and SF and between LF and SF, with SF being the group with 
the highest board size adjusted value.  
---§--- 
In order to answer research question two, we perform a series of multivariate 
cross section regressions to investigate the type of relationship between ownership and 
corporate governance indicators and historical performance, which, in this case, is 
proxied by ROI in the year 2012. The reason why we limit it to only one year is due to 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance TEST.T (mean) TEST.F (variance) TEST.T (mean) TEST.F (variance) TEST.T (mean) TEST.F (variance)
Board Independence 0,33 0,47 0,31 0,46 0,32 0,47 0,20 0,67 0,19 0,62 0,39 0,91
CEO Duality 0,36 0,48 0,35 0,48 0,35 0,48 0,40 0,93 0,23 0,77 0,39 0,90
Ownership Concentration 2,96 1,25 2,91 1,25 2,91 1,26 0,22 0,98 0,10 0,62 0,46 0,69
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,69 0,38 0,75 0,35 0,71 0,38 0,00*** 0,04 0,05** 0,94 0,01*** 0,02
Only One Manager 0,29 0,45 0,32 0,47 0,28 0,45 0,10 0,43 0,28 0,67 0,03** 0,22
Team Size 0,65 0,73 0,64 0,74 0,66 0,78 0,42 0,54 0,27 0,00 0,26 0,13
Board of Director Size 1,61 0,99 1,62 1,04 1,70 1,05 0,46 0,17 0,01*** 0,01 0,04 0,69
LF-SFSA LF SF SA-LF SA-SF
**5% significant, *** 1% significant 
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data availability, three control variables were considered in running the regression: cost 
of employees, total assets and firm age7.  
Table 3 shows the regressions output for the three firm clusters under analysis. 
We find a significant relationship between historical performance and three out of seven 
governance indicators. Specifically, for LF firms we find a positive correlation between 
Team Size and past performance while a negative one with the Only One Manager 
variable. Differently, for SA firms we find a negative relationship between Team Size 
and past performance while a positive one with Board Size. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Statistics for historical performance and governance characteristics 
Results from estimating OLS regression models of the determinants of historical firm performance. The dependent 
variable is ROI for the year 2012 while the independent variables are corporate governance variables as defined 
in section 4 (research methodology) and three control variables (cost of employees, total assets and firm age).  
The table reports the constant value, the coefficient values for each control variables whereas the second to last 
column is indicative of the coefficient value for each corporate governance variable (reported on each line of the 
table). Finally, the last column is the value of the R-squared for each regression. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
7 A fourth variable, total sales, was considered as a control variable but discarded due to multi-
collinearity 
Dependent Variable: ROI 2012
LF
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,24-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,02          0,02                
t-test 7,62-        1,93                        2,25-                 2,75-          0,94          
CEO Duality 0,24-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,01          0,03                
t-test 7,36-        2,02                        2,29-                 2,77-          0,40          
Ownership Concentration 0,27-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,01-          0,01                
t-test 5,89-        2,80                        2,57-                 1,73-          0,52-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,30-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,01          0,01                
t-test 7,03-        2,75                        2,76-                 1,51-          0,29          
Only one Manager 0,26-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          -0,06** 0,02                
t-test 8,45-        2,60                        2,75-                 1,89-          2,25-          
Team Size 0,30-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,02*** 0,01                
t-test 10,24-      2,67                        2,67                 2,67          10,24-        
Board of Directors Size 0,28-        0,00                        0,00-                 0,00-          0,02          0,03                
t-test 5,97-        2,34                        2,38-                 2,68-          1,31          
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---§--- 
Research question three aims to investigate the type of relationship among 
banks financing decisions and ownership and governance indicators. Results of 
regression analysis are presented in Table 4. We observe that there is a significant 
relationship in four out of seven governance indicators: Presence of Manager among 
Shareholders has a negative relationship with financing in SF firms, Only One Manager 
has a positive relationship for both LF and SA firms while Board Size and Team Size 
have a negative relationship with financing in all three clusters. 
 
 
SF
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,14        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,01-          0,00-                
1,88        0,11-                        0,19-                 0,18          0,14-          
CEO Duality 0,16        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,05-          0,00-                
2,12        0,12-                        0,19-                 0,17          0,88-          
Ownership Concentration 0,18        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,02-          0,00-                
1,90        0,13-                        0,07-                 0,22          0,95-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,07        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,05          0,00-                
0,81        0,12-                        0,03-                 0,31          0,68          
Only one Manager 0,14        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,07-          0,00-                
1,99        0,16-                        0,15-                 0,17          1,02-          
Team Size 0,09        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,04          0,00-                
1,33        0,21-                        0,21-                 0,21-          1,33          
Board of Directors Size 0,08        0,00-                        0,00-                 0,00          0,03          0,00-                
0,70        0,10-                        0,14-                 0,25          0,78          
SA
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,08        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,00-          0,01                
5,16        0,59                        0,30                 3,28-          0,15-          
CEO Duality 0,07        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,01          0,01                
4,86        0,62                        0,25                 3,30-          0,46          
Ownership Concentration 0,08        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,00-          0,02                
5,68        0,99                        0,05                 4,85-          0,53-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,06        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,02          0,01                
4,10        0,88                        0,22                 4,09-          1,30          
Only one Manager 0,08        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,01-          0,01                
6,76        0,64                        0,06                 4,16-          1,34-          
Team Size 0,07        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          -0,00*** 0,01                
6,47        0,72                        0,72                 0,72          6,47          
Board of Directors Size 0,03        0,00                        0,00                 0,00-          0,02*** 0,02                
1,53        0,72                        0,55                 3,10-          2,48          
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Table 4: Regression Statistics for banks financing and governance/ownership characteristics 
Results from estimating OLS regression models of the determinants of financing from the banking system. The 
dependent variable is DEB/OPRE for the year 2012 while the independent variables are corporate governance 
variables as defined in section 4 (research methodology) and three control variables (cost of employees, total 
assets and firm age). The table reports the constant value, the coefficient values for each control variables whereas 
the second to last column is indicative of the coefficient value for each corporate governance variable (reported 
on each line of the table). Finally, the last column is the value of the R-squared for each regression. 
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---§--- 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between the merit of credit, proxied by the 
difference between ROI and T_ROI, which is a prototype of an integrated rating system 
developed by Mantovani et al. (2013), and the firms’ governance and ownership 
characteristics (i.e. research question #4). Table 5 shows the results of regression 
analysis. Four governance variables have statistically significant relationships with the 
merit of credit (ex-ante performance) variable. Specifically, both SA and LF have a 
negative relationship between Only One Manager and ex ante performance. While, all 
three clusters have a positive relationship with Team Size. Additionally, SA have a 
positive relationship with Board Size while SF have a positive relationship with the 
Presence of Manager among Shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SA
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,25        0,00-                        0,00        0,00        0,05-          0,00                 
5,64        0,78-                        0,28        0,53        1,35-          
CEO Duality 0,22        0,00-                        0,00        0,00        0,02          0,00-                 
4,89        0,77-                        0,15        0,44        0,66          
Ownership Concentration 0,23        0,00-                        0,00        0,00-        0,03          0,00-                 
2,66        1,37-                        0,65        0,00-        1,32          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,22        0,00-                        0,00        0,00-        0,12* 0,00                 
2,73        1,14-                        0,96        0,08-        1,65          
Only one Manager 0,24        0,00-                        0,00        0,00        0,18*** 0,01                 
3,80        1,14-                        0,88        0,13        3,12          
Team Size 0,36        0,00-                        0,00        0,00-        -0,10*** 0,01                 
5,77        1,42-                        1,42-        1,42-        5,77          
Board of Directors Size 0,48        0,00-                        0,00-        0,00        -0,11*** 0,03                 
7,28        1,08-                        0,29-        0,10        4,85-          
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Table 5: Regression Statistics for ex-ante performance and governance characteristics 
This table reports results from estimating OLS regression models of the determinants of ex ante firm performance 
(merit of credit). The dependent variable is ROI – T_ROI while the independent variables are corporate 
governance variables as defined in section 4 (research methodology) and three control variables (cost of 
employees, total assets and firm age). 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Rating
LF
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,24-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,02          0,02                 
7,62-        1,93                         2,25-          2,75-        0,94          
CEO Duality 0,24-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,01          0,03                 
7,36-        2,02                         2,29-          2,77-        0,40          
Ownership Concentration 0,27-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,01-          0,01                 
5,89-        2,80                         2,57-          1,73-        0,52-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,30-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,01          0,01                 
7,03-        2,75                         2,76-          1,51-        0,29          
Only one Manager 0,26-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        -0,06*** 0,02                 
8,45-        2,60                         2,75-          1,89-        2,25-          
Team Size 0,30-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,02*** 0,01                 
10,24-      2,67                         2,67          2,67        10,24-        
Board of Directors Size 0,28-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,02          0,03                 
5,97-        2,34                         2,38-          2,68-        1,31          
SF
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,12-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,03-          0,00                 
4,13-        1,15                         1,50-          2,20        1,14-          
CEO Duality 0,12-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,03-          0,00                 
3,90-        1,16                         1,54-          2,14        1,29-          
Ownership Concentration 0,08-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,01-          0,00                 
2,59-        1,28                         1,66-          1,86        1,43-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,16-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,06*** 0,00                 
5,28-        1,33                         1,46-          2,02        2,23          
Only one Manager 0,12-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,01          0,00                 
5,02-        1,26                         1,70-          2,00        0,67          
Team Size 0,12-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,00*** 0,00                 
4,99-        1,23                         1,23          1,23        4,99-          
Board of Directors Size 0,19-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,02* 0,00                 
4,36-        1,21                         1,44-          2,29        1,65          
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IV. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate and find out interesting differences in terms of 
ownership and governance characteristics between three groups of firms (SA, LF, and 
SF) with high density of Productive Chain Networks, as defined by Mestroni et al. (2013) 
that it is the prosecution of prior work by Basilico et al. (2014).  
The main results we have reached are the following: 
i. The three groups of firms have statistically significant differences in 
terms of “Presence of Manager among “Shareholders” and in terms of “Only One 
Manager” variables. Leader firms result as those having more managers among 
shareholders but are also those with the highest presence of an “Only One Manager” 
structure. This is congruent with the result by Basilico et al. (2014), which found that 
banks seem to prefer this structure when financing firms. In fact, it is confirmed by 
regression analysis (Table 3), where we find that higher amount of debt is related to the 
presence of “Only One Manger” in both SA and LF, which are firms directly financed 
by banks in a Supply Chain Network. 
ii. It appears that banks prefer to finance firms with worst governance 
characteristics, mostly in the case of SA and LF, which are directly financed by banks. In 
fact, the empirical evidence shows that firms with lower Board Independence, lower 
CEO Duality, lower Ownership Concentration, presence of One Manager as well as 
smaller Team and Board size, receive the highest amount of debt.  Differently the 
integrated rating system, prefers the opposite situation, i.e. firms with less presence of 
One Manager, bigger Team and Board Size.  
SA
Independent Variables constant cost of employees total asset age coefficient Adj R-squared
Board Independence 0,25-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,05          0,00                 
5,64-        0,78                         0,28-          0,53-        1,35          
CEO Duality 0,22-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        0,02-          0,00-                 
4,89-        0,77                         0,15-          0,44-        0,66-          
Ownership Concentration 0,23-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,03-          0,00-                 
2,66-        1,37                         0,65-          0,00        1,32-          
Presence of Manager among Shareholders 0,22-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        -0,12* 0,00                 
2,73-        1,14                         0,96-          0,08        1,65-          
Only one Manager 0,24-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00-        -0,18*** 0,01                 
3,80-        1,14                         0,88-          0,13-        3,12-          
Team Size 0,36-        0,00                         0,00-          0,00        0,10*** 0,01                 
5,77-        1,42                         1,42          1,42        5,77-          
Board of Directors Size 0,48-        0,00                         0,00          0,00-        0,11*** 0,03                 
7,28-        1,08                         0,29          0,10-        4,85          
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The above evidence may have two possible explanations according to Corporate 
Finance approach and with Entrepreneurial Finance theory. In relation to the first 
approach, it seems to demonstrate the inefficiencies of widely used (i.e. Basel compliant) 
credit allowance procedures; in fact, governance-inefficient companies are funded. On 
the other hand, an Entrepreneurial Finance system might suggest that the above evidence 
supports the impact of the entrepreneurial behavior over the merit of credit. Initial 
evidence of this second explanation is given by the positive relationship between the 
control variable “cost of employees” and both past and ex-ante performance. The fact 
that “cost of labor” is a driver of performance confirms that human capital is a 
determinant of the competitive advantage along with the Entrepreneurial Competences. 
This topic is worthy further investigation which will be object of future research. 
Productive Chains seem to allow the adoption of an entrepreneurial approach even in 
complex organizations (i.e. the meta-firms), which might lead to long term 
improvements of the return-to-risk ratio of the chain as a whole.   
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